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SECURITIES: THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION
AND RULE 146
Judson L. Temple
INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 19331 was enacted "to protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions." '2 This Act followed an era in which the flotation
of worthless securities8 was widespread which resulted in "tragedy
in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings,
accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities. '4 The
Act does not seek to prohibit the sale of worthless securities; it seeks
to protect the investing public by compelling disclosure to the public
of all information necessary for an accurate evaluation of the worth
of the securities.5 The information required by disclosure is contained
in a registration statement. 6 , Section 57 of the Act provides that no
securities shall be sold or offered for sale by means of interstate
transportation or communication or use of the mails unless a registration statement has been filed and approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission s as to those securities.
Certain securities and certain transactions are exempted from the
registration requirements of Section 5.0 Section 4(2) contains what is
commonly known as the private offering exemption: "The provisions
of section 5 shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."'10 The scope of the private offering exemption is
not defined in the Act." Nor is the legislative history of the Act of
much help in delimiting the scope of the exemption. 12 The exemption
has taken on its present structure through the decisions of the courts
and the interpretations of the SEC.' 3 The standards which have evolved
115 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
2SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
8

" Security " is defined in the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1970).
'H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
"SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 2 at 124.
'Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(8), 7; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(8), 77(f) (1970).
7
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5(a), (c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c) (1970).
'hereinafter cited as SEC.
OExempted securities are set out in Securities Act of 1933 § 3; 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)
(1970).
Exempted transactions are set out in Securities Act of 1933 § 4; 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)
(1970).
"Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
"See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (October 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Release 5430], 2 SEC DocKET 551.
'See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 2 at 122, 123.
lAdditional information on the private offering exemption can be found in the following sources: 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES
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have generated more confusion than certainty as to when the exemption
is available. For this reason the SEC has proposed to adopt Rule 146
"to provide more objective standards for determining when offers or
sales of securities by an issuer would be deemed transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the
Act and thus would be exempt from the registration provisions of the
Act."'1 4 Rule 146 was first promulgated in proposed form on November
28, 1972.15 The SEC revised the proposed rule on October 10, 1973, in
response to criticisms of the rule in its original form.' 6 As of the date
of this writing, Rule 146, as revised, remains in proposed form and it
may well be adopted in this form early in 1974.17
This Comment has two purposes: 1) To trace the private offering
exemption as it has developed by case law and SEC interpretations, and
2) To assess the impact of Rule 146 on the private offering exemption.
A security sold pursuant to the private offering exemption is a
restricted security,' i.e., there are limitations on the ability of the
holder of the security to resell it to the public. It is clear that such a
limitation is necessary. Otherwise, securities sold pursuant to the private offering exemption, without registration, might be distributed
to the public through resales, defeating the objectives of the 1933
Securities Act. The problems associated with the resale of securities
are beyond the scope of this paper. 19
Even if Rule 146 is adopted, the present development of the private
offering exemption by case law and SEC interpretations will remain of
more than academic interest. This is true for two reasons: 1) Rule 146
is cast in light of existing private offering concepts so that an understanding of these concepts will aid the understanding of Rule 146, and
2) Rule 146 is a "safe harbor" rule only, i.e., an issuer who sells securities
and who meets all the conditions of Rule 146 will be deemed to be within
the bounds of the private offering exemption.20 It will not be necessary
to comply with Rule 146, however, to satisfy the private offering exemption. Failure to satisfy Rule 146 will not even raise a presumption
21
that the private offering exemption is not met.

(2d ed. 1973); 1 L. LOSS, SacuRrnzs RFULATiON (3d ed. 1961); SECURITIES
LAW PRACTICE (Ill. Inst. for CLE, 1973).
"Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 550.
15SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (November 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Release 5336], 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
"Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 550.
T
SECURITIES LAW PRACTICE (Ill. Inst. for CLE, 1979), Authors' Note on
Chapter 3.
'sSee Rule 144(a), SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (January 11, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Release 5223] for a definition of a restricted security.
19Rule 144, Release 5223 sets forth reasonably objective conditions for the resale of
securities acquired through a private placement under the Securities Act of 1933

§ 4(2).

"Release 5430, 2 SEC DocxT 550.
nId. at 557.
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Thus, an issuer who is charged with the sale of securities without
a registration statement and who raises the defense of Rule 146 will be
found in violation of the Act only if the court independently finds that
the issuer did not meet the conditions of Rule 146 and that the issuer
did not satisfy the requirements of the private offering exemption as
they have developed by case law and by SEC interpretations.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
There is very little in the legislative history of the 1933 Securities
Act which sheds light on the intended scope of the private offering
exemption. H.R. Rep. No. 85 notes that the Act "carefully exempts
from its application certain types of securities transactions where there
is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits
are too remote. '22 A subsequent reference says that the private offering
exemption permits "an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of
its securities to a particular person. . . ."23 Finally, H.R. Rep. No. 152
states that "[slales of stock to stockholders become subject to the act
unless the stockholders are so small in number that the sale to them
'24
does not constitute a public offering.
The first definitive work on the private offering exemption was
SEC Release No. 285.25 Release 285 first held that what was a private
or public offering was a question of fact to be determined upon all
the circumstances of the individual case. 26 The release then listed four
main criteria to be applied in the determination:
1. The Number of Offerees and Their Relationship to Each Other
and to the Issuer ;27
2. The Number of Units Offered ;28
3.

The Size of the Offering ;29

4.

The Manner of Offering."

The release noted that an offering to "an insubstantial number of
persons" was presumptively a private offering 8 ' and that "under ordinary circumstances an offering to not more than approximately twenty"32 This
five persons is not an offering to a substantial number ....
* H.R. Rzr. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
23Id. at 16.

uH.R. Rzp. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
OSEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (January 24, 1935)
lease 285], 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
2740.
wRelease 285, 1 OCR FED. SEc. L. REn'.
-7 1d. 2741.

-1d.
-Id.
-31d.
-1d.

[hereinafter cited as Re-

2740.

2742.
2743.
2744.
2740.

aid. by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974
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position was qualified in that the basis on which the offerees were
selected was highly relevant in determining what constitutes a substantial number. Thus, a class of offerees chosen on the basis of "some
pre-existing standard" 33 or who had "special knowledge of the issuer" 34
was more likely to result in a private offering than an arbitrarily
chosen group of offerees. Further, an offering in which the number
of units offered was small was more likely to be a private offering
than an offering of a large number of units which carried a greater
likelihood of eventual distribution to the public. 35 Similarly, an offering
of small size (i.e., small dollar value) was less likely to be public than
an offering of a larger size. 3 6 Finally, the manner of offering was
relevant. Offers or sales effected by "direct negotiation" between the
issuer and offeree or buyer were more likely to be private than those
'3
effected by means of "the machinery of public distribution. T
SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mining Co.a8 contributed to the developing
body of law in this area. In order to finance the purchase of the assets
of Golden West Consolidated Mines, Sunbeam solicited loans from
stockholders of Sunbeam and Golden West. Each contributing stockholder received a promissory note, denoted a "shareholder's receipt"3 9
containing the promise of Sunbeam to repay the sum loaned with
interest. The SEC charged that the shareholder's receipt was a security
and must be registered pursuant to Section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act.
Sunbeam claimed that the transactions were exempt from registration
in that they constituted a private offering. Sunbeam claimed that since
the transactions were conducted only with stockholders of Sunbeam and
Golden West and were not open to the general public, the offering was
private. Sunbeam claimed that an offering was a public offering only
if it was open to everybody. The district court accepted this argument,
but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed:
In its broadest meaning, the term 'public' distinguishes the populace
at large from groups of individual members of the public segregated
because of some common interest or characteristic. Yet such a distinction is inadequate for practical purposes; manifestly, an offering
of securities to all red-headed men, to all residents of Chicago or
San Francisco, to all existing stockholders of the General Motors
Corporation or the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
is no less 'public,' in every realistic sense of the word, than an unrestricted offering to the world at large. Such an offering, though
not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is nonetheless 'public'
in character, for the means used to select the particular individuals
to whom the offering is to be made bear no sensible relation to the
purposes for which the selection is made. For the purposes of an
offering of securities, red-headed men, residents of San Francisco,
and stockholders of General Motors are as much members of the
-Id.
"Id.

2741.

-d.
-Id.

2742.
2743.

-Id.
2744.
'SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
"Id. at 700.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/6
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public as their antithetical counterparts. To determine the distinction
between 'public' and 'private' in any particular context, it is essential
to examine the circumstances under which the distinction is sought
to be established and to consider the purposes sought to be achieved
by such distinction.'

The Court concluded that an offering limited to the stockholders of a
single company could be a public offering. The Court also made two
important evidentiary holdings: the burden of proof lies on the person
claiming the private offering exemption; and the terms of such an
exception to the Act must be "strictly construed" against the person
claiming its benefit. 4 1 Since Sunbeam had no facts to submit other than
that all offerees were stockholders, it failed its burden of proof that
the offering was private.
At this juncture the issuer contemplating a private offering had a
number of criteria to guide him: the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the issuer, the number of units offered,
the size and manner of the offering, and the fact that an offering need
not be open to the general public to be a public offering. But these
tests were not capable of objective measurement, and there was little
indication of how they inter-related with each other. With this as a
background, 42 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.4 3 In Ralston Purina, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely
faced for the only time the scope of the private offering exemption.
The Court's decision completely altered the approach taken to the
private offering exemption.
THE RALSTON PURINA CASE
Ralston Purina manufactured and distributed feed and cereal products. It undertook a program to encourage stock ownership among
its employees. Apparently mindful of the lesson of Sunbeam that an
offering of company stock to all its employees would be a public offering requiring registration, Ralston Purina sought to gain the shelter
of the private offering exemption by limiting its offer to those employees
who took the initiative in buying Ralston Purina stock and who were
"key employees."
A key employee . . is not confined to an organization chart. It
would include an individual who is eligible for promotion, an individual who especially influences others or who advises others, a
person whom the employees look to in some special way, an individual, of course, who carries some special responsibility, who is
sympathetic to management and who is ambitioous and who the
management feels is likely to be promoted to a greater responsibility.-

401d. at 701.

"Id.
"See also Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943); Campbell
v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
"SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
"Id. at 121-122.
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In actuality, key employees included an "artist, bakeshop foreman,
chow loading foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock
clerk, mill office clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer, and veterinarian. ' 45 The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the
holding of Sunbeam that "to be public an offer need not be open to the
whole world. '46 But the Court went further:
Exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
is the question. The design of the statute is to protect investors
by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions. The natural way to interpret the
private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. Since
exempt transactions are those as to which 'there is no practical need
for (the bill's) application,' the applicability of §4(1) [now §4(2)]
should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected
needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown
to be able to fend "for themselves is a transaction 'not involving
any public offering.
Thus, in every case the crucial question is the need of the class of
offerees for the protection of the Act or the ability of the class to fend
for themselves. Did the "key employees" of Ralston Purina need the
protection of the Act's registration provisions? Yes, they did.
The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose. The obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable that they be
entitled to compliance with §5."
Thus, the private offering exemption was not available to Ralston
on these facts. The Court did find that some offerings to employees
might come within the folds of the private offering exemption, e.g.,
offerings made "to executive personnel who because of their position
have access to the same kind of information that the Act would make
available in the form of a registrative statement. '49 The Court also
addressed itself to the relevance of the number of offerees to the private
offering exemption. The Court refused to hold, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that an offering to a "substantial number" of the public
was necessarily a public offering or that an offering to just a few was
necessarily private. 50 But, the SEC remained free to impose a numbers test
in determining when to investigate claims of a private offering exemption
51
from registration.
THE AFTERMATH OF RALSTON PURINA
The U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken since the Ralston Purina
case on the scope of the private offering exemption. The U.S. Circuit

"Id.
"Id.
171d.
'id.
ADId.
5Id.
Rud.

at
at
at
at
at
at

121.
123.
124-125.
126-127.
125-126.
125.
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Courts of Appeal have had the role of determining when a class of
offerees was not in need of the protection afforded by registration under
the 1933 Securities Act so that the offering could be properly classified
as private. 5 2 The U.S. Supreme Court held an offering was private
whenever the offerees could "fend for themselves." On the facts of
the Ralston Purina offering, the offerees could fend for themselves only
if they had access to corporate financial information of the type that
would be available to executive personnel of the corporation. "Access"
was a requirement on the Ralston facts, but did this mean that in no
case could an offeree "fend for himself" unless he had "access"? Or
could an offeree "fend for himself" in some situations merely by possessing investment experience and financial sophistication? Would the
"access" requirement be met, when it was required, if the issuer opened
up the company books to the offeree? Or did the "access" have to stem
from a pre-existing relationship between the issuer and the offeree
such as employment of the offeree in an executive capacity by the
issuing company?
An analysis of the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal indicates that "access"--or its absence-is one of the factors most heavily
53
weighted in determining whether the offering is public or private.
In many cases "access" (or the knowledge which can be gained through
access) is equated with the "need of the offerees for the protection the
Act provides" or with their ability to "fend for themselves. '54 SEC v.
Tax Service, Inc.,55 is merely illustrative. There the issuer offered to
sell stock to purchasers of or subscribers to the issuer's publications
and to the members of a county bar. The court noted that the status
of subscriber or attorney did not provide the offeree with access to the
52The following cases are particularly relevant, though not an exhaustive listing:
Second Circuit: Gilligan, Will and Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v.
Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960); Katz v. Amos Treat and Co., 411
F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969);
Fourth Circuit: SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corporation, 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967);
Fifth Circuit: Hill York Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680 (5th Cir. 1971); Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.
1972); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of B.C., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972);
Sixth Circuit: Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969);
Tenth Circuit: Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Garfield v.
Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24
(10th Cir. 1966); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
5'Gilligan, Will and Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Guild
Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., 357 F.2d
143, 144 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. uster Channel Wing Corporation, 376
F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cr. 1967); Hill York Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchises,
Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C.,
463 F.2d 137, 158-159 (5th Cir. 1972); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th
Cir. 1971).
"Gilligan, Will and Co. v. SEC, supra note 53 at 466; SEC v. Guild Films Co., supra
note 53 at 490; SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., supra note 53 at 144; Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1965); Bryant v. Uland, 327 F. Supp.
439, 442-443 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Bowers v. Columbia General Corporation, 336 F. Supp.
609, 623-624 (D. Del. 1971).
'SEC v. Tax Service, Inc., 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966).
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kind of information a registration statement would make available. The
court concluded:
Thus where the class of offerees has neither knowledge of nor
'access to the kind of information which registration would disclose,' the offerees are in need of the protection of the Act and the
full disclosure derived from compliance with section 5.'
Other cases have indicated that a factor to be considered along with
"accesss" in assessing the need of the offerees for the protections of
the Act is the "sophistication" of the offeree in financial and investment
matters. 57 It is probably fair to say, however, that "sophistication" has
been less stressed by the courts than has "access." Some of the more
prominent decisions which have given emphasis to offeree "sophistication"
have been from the Tenth Circuit. 55
In Lively v. Hirschfeld,5 9 Hirschfeld sold 8,000 shares of stock. There
were 20-25 offerees, who were "friends, educated persons, business associates and acquaintances" 60 of Hirschfeld. The court held that business
experience and "access" were both requisites for a private offering.
The Supreme Court in its description of a possible 'private' group in
Ralston Purina includes only persons of exceptional business experience, and 'a position where they have regular access to all the information' and records which would show the potential for the corporation.
This case is notable for the narrow construction which the court gave
to the private offering exemption. The plaintiff who testified the most
was an airliine pilot of "considerable business experience. '6 2 He was
told the essentials of the corporate structure, e.g., the number of shares
outstanding, their par value, and the names of corporate officers. There
was no evidence that any corporate information was withheld from
him although he did not ask for information. But the court held that
even as to this plaintiff, the private offering exemption was not available. 63 Apparently, the pilot did not have the "exceptional business
experience" or the "regular access" to corporate records that was required. There were other offerees to whom only general references were
made. Since to qualify for the private offering exemption, the offeror
must prove that every offeree meets the conditions of the exemption,
"[tihe testimony as to all other offerees was woefully short of the re'64
quirement.
1id. at 144.
57Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108,. 115 (10th Cir. 1959) (purchasers used sophisticated discernment) ; Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Lively v.
Hlirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971); Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F.
Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo.
1959); Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 212 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
"The first three cases cited in note 57.
MLively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 632.
61Id. at 633.
1id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
"Id.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/6
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Several decisions have emphasized that offeree "sophistication" is
not sufficient in the absence of "access." 6 5 In Bill York Corp. v. American InternationalFranchises,Inc.,66 the court said:
Obviously if the plaintiffs did not possess the information requisite
for a registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated
knowledge of business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to
invest in this franchise sales center.'
A line of cases either hold or can be interpreted to be in accord
with the proposition that access of the offeree to the kind of information
which the Securities Act would make available in the form of a registration statement does not exist by virtue of the fact that the issuer
voluntarily makes this information available.6 8 These cases require, or
are consistent with the requirement, that there be a pre-existing relationship between the issuer and the offeree which causes the offeree to
69
have "access." As indicated above, Ralston Purina
is consistent with
this construction of "access" although the case is susceptible of a less
narrow construction. The Hirschfeld court also indicated that it interpreted the private offering exemption to demand that the offerees held
"a position where they have regular access to all the information and
records which would show the potential for the corporation."7 0 This
is consistent with the present construction of "access." The SEC also
adopted this construction of access:
The [Ralston] Court's concept is that the exemption is necessarily
narrow. The exemption does not become available simply because
offerees are voluntarily furnished information about the issuer. Such
a construction would give each issuer the choice of registering or
making its own voluntary disclosures
without regard to the standards
and sanctions of the Act.'
That "access" requires a pre-existing relationship between the issuer
and the offeree was adopted in a federal district court decision, United
States v. Hill.7 2 The defendant, Hill, was struggling to finance two corporations he controlled. Hill personally authorized the sale of promissory notes to certain old friends and acquaintances of his. The sale was
made by one of the corporations. The purchasers had no actual knowledge of the information that would have been available in a registration statement. The court found they also lacked the requisite access
to such information. For there to be access "there must be some relationGUnited States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v.
Custer Channel Wing Corporation, 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967); Hill York
Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchies, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
'Hill York Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchies, Inc., supra note 65.
11Id. at 690.
"United States v. Hill, supra note 65 at 1229 and SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.
of S.C., supra note 53 at 160 so hold. SEC v. Talston Purina Co., supra note 2 and
Lively v. Hirschfeld, supra note 59 are consistent with this interpretation of access.
"'SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 2.
"OLively v. Hirschfeld, supra note 59 at 633.
"1SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (November 6, 1962) [hereinafter cited as
Release 4552], 1 CCH FED. Szc. L. REP.
2773.
"United States v. Hill, supra note 65.
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ship between the members of that group and the issuer which demonstrates that the group has access to corporate information. 7 3 Here,
the holders of the promissory notes had no such relationship.
Defendant has asserted that he would have supplied any information
an investor desired. However, this is not what is meant by access
to information about the issuer. . . Such an arrangement would

always permit a company to circumvent the registration requirements of the Act by the simple expedient of offering to open up the

corporate books."

This construction of "access" reached a climax in SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co. of S.C.75 In United States v. Hill, the offering was not carefully administered and failed as a private offering on other clear-cut
grounds 7 -- so that the court's statements above were not necessary to
the decision. But in Continental, the court found an offering to be public
although the issuer had carefully planned the offering and had taken
elaborate measures to insure that the offering would qualify for the
private offering exemption.
Continental's management planned to offer and sell 200,000 shares
of Continental common stock ($0.10 par value, at $1.00 per share).77
To insure the privacy of the offering, Continental took the following
steps. Continental prepared a brochure on its prospects, including unaudited financial statements.78 The brochure was periodically updated.
The brochure carried a legend on the front that the shares offered were
not registered with the SEC and that purchasers of them must have an
investment intent. Continental prepared a subscription agreement and
investment letter to be executed by all purchasers of the stock.7 9 The
instrument recited that the purchaser understood the investment being
made and its risks, that he had received a copy of the brochure and had
read it, that the purchaser had questioned officers and counsel for the
company concerning the business and financial statements of the company and did not desire further data concerning the company. Continental stamped a legend on each stock certificate sold pursuant to the
offering which stated that the stocks were restricted. 80 The legal counsel
for Continental who were engineering the placement of the securities
met personally with prospective purchasers at meetings arranged to
promote the sale of the securities. 81

"Id. at 1229.
"Id.

5SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Continental].
"The defendant, Hill, did not utilize the basic techniques normally employed to
prevent unauthorized resales. He continued primary sales although he had knowledge
of resales. Resale purchasers possessed information inadequate for a private offering.
"Continental, supra note 75 at 146.
"Id.
791d.

6ld. at 147.
"Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/6
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The Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the offers were made to
"dentists, physicians, housewives, and businessmen, who had no relationships with Continental other than that of shareholder once the purchases
'2
were made.
Even if it were assumed that Continental's prospectus provided
those offerees to whom it was disseminated with all the information
that registration would disclose, this would not suffice to establish
the requisite relationship of those offerees to the company.'
In addition, a few offerees were shown not to have received the
brochure or to have met with officials of Continental.8 4 Consequently,
8 5
the offering was held to be public.
These cases illustrate some of the approaches which have been taken
toward the private offering exemption in the aftermath of the Ralston
Purina decision. They also highlight the narrowness with which the
exemption has sometimes been viewed. If the limitations imposed by
these cases are taken together, then little would seem to be left of the
private offering exemption. Thus, the "sophistication" of the offeree
is no substitute for his "access" to the kind of information that a registration statement would disclose. Without "access," the offeree is in
need of the protections of the Securities Act, and the private offering
exemption does not apply. But "access" cannot be achieved by a voluntary disclosure by the issuer of the needed information. The "access"
must stem from a pre-existing relationship between the issuer and the
offeree. A mere employment relationship does not suffice, nor does that
of stockholder of the issuer, nor that of subscriber to the issuer's publications. The only adequate pre-existing relationship expressed in the
cases is that between the issuer and the offeree who is a high-level
86
executive official of the issuer.
Finally, some courts have focused, not solely on concepts of access
and sophistication, but on factors such as the size of the offering or
the number of units offered.8 7 The test of the number of offerees is
nearly inevitably considered by the courts if only to disclaim it.88 The
courts have frequently denied a private offering exemption, not because

8MId. at 158.
8id. at 160.
"Id.
8MId. at 161.
"The SEC has taken the position that the sale of stock to promoters of a business
would be a private placement. Release 4552, 1 CCH FED. SEc. REP.
2774.
87
Hill York Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchies, Inc., 448 P.2d 680, 689
(5th
Cir. 1971); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969); Woodward v.
Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959); Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119
(10th Cir. 1963); Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24, 28 (10th Cir. 1966);
Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D. Minn. 1958); Repass v.
Rees, 174 F. Supp. 895, 903 (D. Colo. 1959); Vicioso v. Watson, 325 F. Supp.
1071, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
'See the cases cited in note 52.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974

11

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
35 [1974],
Iss. 2, Art. 6
REVIEW
LAW

[Vol. 35

but because the proof
the quality of the defendant's proof was lacking,
9
failed to extend to each and every offeree.8
PROPOSED RULE 146, AS REVISED
The focus of this discussion will be on the revised form
146.90 The revised form contains a number of improvements
original form9' and is the form most likely to be adopted.9 2
herein, the term "Rule 146" or "Rule" refers to the revised
Rule 146.

9

of Rule
over the
As used
form of

3

Rule 146 is intended to "provide more objective standards" for
the application of the private offering exemption.9 4 This, according to
the SEC, will serve two purposes:
First, such a rule should deter reliance on that exemption for offerings of securities to persons who are unable to fend for themselves
in terms of obtaining and evaluating information about the issuer
and in certain situations, of assuming the risk of investment. These
persons need the protections afforded by the registration process.
Second, such a rule should reduce uncertainty to the extent feasible
and provide more objective standards upon which responsible businessmen may rely in raising capital in a manner that complies with the
requirements of the Act.'
All of the conditions of Rule 146 must be satisfied if the Rule is
to be relied upon.9 6 If all of the conditions are satisfied, then the
issuer will be deemed not to have made a public offering.97 A private
offering can still be effected outside Rule 146, however, by meeting
the criteria that have been developed in the case law and in SEC
interpretations.9" Failure to meet the conditions of Rule 146 will not
raise a presumption that the private offering exemption is inapplicable. 99
Rule 146 is available only to the issuer of securities. 100 Securities acquired in reliance on Rule 146 will be restricted. 01' Technical compliance
with Rule 146 will not suffice to preserve the private offering where the
York Corp. v. American Internat'l Franchises, Inc., supra note 87 at 691;
Repass v. Rees, supra note 87 at 904; Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261,

8Hill

265 (D. Colo. 1965); Bryant v. Uland, 327 F. Supp. 439, 443 (S.D. Tex. 1971).

BFor discussions of the private offering exemption and the original version of Rule

146, see: Recent Developments, Securities Regulation-Private Offering Exemption:

SEC Proposed Rule 146, 48 WASH. L. R51. 922 (1973); Comment, Proposed SEC
Rule 146: The Quest for Objectivity, 41 FORDHAms L. REV. 887 (1973); Note, SEC
Rules 144 and 146: Private Placements for the Few, 59 VA. L. REV. 886 (1973).
9
IThe changes made are discussed in Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 590.
92SECURITIES LAW PRACTICE (Ill. Inst. for CLE, 1973), Authors' Note on Chapter 3.
-The revised form is appended to Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 557.
-Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 550.
M5d.
"Id.

at 558.

KId. at
1Id. at
wId. at
at
"Id.
01
1d. at

559.
558.
557.
558.
550.
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real purpose of the offering is distribution of the securities to the
02
public.
The following discussion will present the major features of Rule
146. Special consideration will be given to whether the Rule achieves
its stated purposes: "to provide more objective standards" for the
application of the private offering exemption.
OFFEREE REPRESENTATrE-RULE 146 (a) (1)

The offeree representative is a person intended to act on behalf
of the offeree in a private offering under Rule 146. He must be a person
who is not "an affiliate, associate or employee" of the issuer (except
in certain limited and well-defined situations),1°3 who has investment
sophistication, 10 4 who is acknowledged by the offeree to be his representative, 10 5 and who discloses in writing to the offeree any past,
existing, or contemplated relationship with the issuer or its affiliates
and any compensation received or to be received, flowing from the
relationship. 0 6
The only serious ambiguity in the definition of offeree representative is the requirement that he have investment sophistication. The
statutory language is that the offeree representative must have:
. ..such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he is capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment.'
What financial or business background satisfies this requirement
is not determined by the case law, and Rule 146 provides no answer.
The "sophistication" requirement of the private offering exemption has
been incorporated into Rule 146, but in equally subjective and uncertain
terms.
NATURE OF OFFERES--RULE

146 (d)

"The issuer and any person acting on its behalf" who make a Rule
146 offering "shall have reasonable grounds to believe prior to making
an offer, and prior to making a sale" that the offeree or his offeree
representative has investment sophistication, and, in case there is 'no
offeree representative, that the offeree is a person able to "bear the
economic risk of investment.' ' 0 8
The requirement of Rule 146 that the issuer have reasonable grounds

102Id. at 557, 558.
wId. at 558.
OId.
1011d. at 559.
"'AId.
1
OTId. at 558.
mosd
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of belief prior to making the offer is probably a necessary requirement,
but it is burdensome on the issuer. The issuer must carefully probe
the backgrounds of the potential offerce and his offeree representative
without making an offer in doing so. No indication is given of what constitutes reasonable grounds for belief by the issuer. If, however, he
mistakenly believes that investment sophistication or ability to bear
the economic risk is present when it is not, Rule 146 will still be available if no sale to the offeree is consummated. 0 9
Rule 146 does not define what is meant by the ability to "bear the
economic risk of investment." This ambiguity is a thorn in the side
of the issuer as he has the obligation of ascertaining that the offeree
can bear the economic risk and the burden of proving that he has satisfied all conditions of the Rule.
LIMITATIONS ON MANNER OF 0FFERING--RULE

146 (c)

An offering will not satisfy Rule 146 if it employs any means of
"general advertising." 110 This position is consistent with prior SEC
releases."' Prohibited modes of communication include newspapers,
magazines, radio, and television.112 Also prohibited are seminars, meetings, and written communications which are attended by or directed to
persons other than those possessing the requisite investment sophistica5
tion and ability to "bear the economic risk of investment."" 13
An important condition is that the offeree or his offeree representative shall have the opportunity, prior to sale, to ask questions of the
issuer or any person acting on its behalf and to receive answers concerning information relevant to the decision to accept or reject the
offering." 14
This provision seems to be reasonably free of ambiguity.
ACCESS TO

OR

FURNISHING OF INFORMATION-RULE

146 (e)

This provision embodies the judicial determination that without
access to the kind of information made available by registration, there
can be no private offering. This section provides in part that prior to
sale, each offeree or his offeree representative shall:
(1) have access to the same kind of information that is required
by Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer possesses
such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or
expense; or

ImId. at 559.
niod.
mRelease 285, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REV.
REP. 2776.
"2Release 5430, 2 SEC DOcKET 559.
ibId.
UId.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/6
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(2) have furnished to him by the issuer or any person acting on
its behalf the same kind of information that is required by Schedule
A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer possesses such information
or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense."'
This provision is a departure from the prior SEC interpretation
that "[t]he exemption does not become available simply because offerees
11 6
The requireare voluntarily furnished information about the issuer."
ments of this section can be met alternatively by access on the part of
the offeree or his offeree representative or by disclosure on the part of
the issuer. If the issuer satisfies this section by disclosure, Rule 146
informs him in further detail what information he is obligated to furnish. 117 This section provides substantially more objective standards
than were previously available. Prior case law spoke only of access
to the information that would be provided by registration in compliance
with Section 5 of the Securities Act. 118 It was not clear at all what constituted "access." Under the proposed Rule 146, the information that
the issuer may provide in compliance with the Rule is explained in
some detail.
As a cautionary note, if the Rule 146 access alternative is relied
upon, the access must exist by reason of the "position" of the offeree
or his offeree representative, with respect to the issuer.
Position means an employment relationship or economic bargaining
power, that enables such person to obtain such information from
the issuer, as distinguished from situations where such relationship
does not exist and the issuer voluntarily offers to provide such information."

Thus, the Rule 146 access standard resembles the restrictive stand120
and Continental.'2 1 It is not
ard embodied in United States v. HilJ
clear what "employment relationship or economic bargaining power"
will satisfy the requirements of this section. In practice, the issuer
will probably prefer to rely upon the disclosure provisions of this
section rather than trust to the access provisions.
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS-RULE 146 (f)

A "business combination" may be a "reclassification, merger, consolidation, transfer of assets, exchange of securities or other similar
business reorganization.' 1 22 Rule 146 makes two special provisions relating to business combinations.
1.

The term "offeree representative" is enlarged to include "any

-Id. at 559, 560.
r'ORelease 4552, 1 CCH FED. Ss c. L. RP.
n7Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 560.

2773.

mSEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 2 at 125, 126.
'"Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKEr 559.

'°United States v. Hill, supra note 65 at 1229.
'Continental, supra note 75 at 160.

560.
5430, 2 SEC DOCKET
Published
by ScholarWorks
at University
of Montana, 1974
"Release

15

Montana Law Review, Vol. 35 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 6
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

affiliate, director or executive officer of a corporation or other organization being acquired pursuant to a business combination ....
,123 But
such a person must meet all the requirements otherwise imposed on
an offeree representative, and he must disclose "in writing to all security holders of the organization to be acquired any arrangements or
terms of the transaction relating to [himself] that are not identical
to those relating to all other security holders of the acquired organ24
ization."1
2. The affiliate, director, or executive officer may solicit from the
security holders of the acquired organization their acceptance of him
as their offeree representative. Rule 146 will deem that such solicitation
is not an offer. 125 Rule 146 strictly limits the manner in which this
26
solicitation can occur.'
This section does not seem to raise any problems of ambiguity.
NUMBER OP PURCHASERS-RuLE

146 (g)

Rule 146 provides:
There shall be no more than thirty-five persons who purchase, from
the issuer, securities of the issuer of the same or similar class in any
consecutive twelve month period in transactions pursuant to this rule,
or not pursuant to this rule, but otherwise in reliance on Section 4(2)
of the Act.!
This provision is subject to certain modifications and exclusions,
all of which are well-defined. 28 The most important may be the exclusion of any person who purchases for cash securities of the issuer
amounting to $150,000 or more.' 29 (For purposes of this section only,
the term "person" includes "corporation, partnership, association, joint
stock company, trust, unincorporated organization, or government or
political subdivision thereof.")1' 0
This section presents no problems of ambiguity.
LIMITATIONS ON DISPOSITION-RULE

146 (h)

The issuer must (1) "make reasonable inquiry to determine if the
purchaser is an underwriter" ;131 (2) place a legend on the securities
indicating they are unregistered and have restricted transferability;132
(3) issue stop-transfer instructions with respect to the securities if the
Lm d.
Imid. at 555.
'LId. at 560.
1"Id. at 560, 561.
IvId. at 561.
LaId.
12Id. This provision is Rule 146(g) (3) (ii) (a).
Mid.
Mid.
usId.
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issuer employs a transfer agent, or otherwise note in its own records
that the securities have restricted transferability;133 and (4) obtain
"from the purchaser a signed written agreement that the securities will
not be sold without registration under the Act or exemption there34
from."1
The purpose of these requirements is to insure that the securities
will not be redistributed to the public following the initial private
placement.
The requirements present no problems of ambiguity.
REPORTS OF SALES--RULE

146 (i)

Unless certain well-defined conditions occur, the issuer must file
with the SEC three copies of a report of sales effected in reliance on
Rule 146.135 The report is to be filed on the SEC's Form 146. Its purpose is to enable the SEC to monitor the operation of Rule 146.
This section also presents no problems of ambiguity.
RULE 146: A CLOSER LOOK
The private offering exemption, prior to Rule 146, has been unsatisfactory because of the uncertainties inherent in it. The exemption was
designed to benefit the issuer. It was designed to save him the expenses
of registration in cases where offerees could "fend for themselves" and
did not need the protections afforded by registration. The problem has
been that the issuer has not known when he could safely rely on the
exemption. The question he has had to pose to himself and his attorney
has been, "Can I afford to risk reliance on the exemption for this
offering?"
Rule 146 is designed to eliminate these uncertainties which plague
the life of the issuer. It is intended to provide a "safe harbor" for the
issuer, i.e., to establish objective and well-defined conditions (so that
the issuer will not mistakenly believe that he has satisfied the conditions when he has not) which, if satisfied, guarantee to the issuer that
the private offering exemption is available to him. Does Rule 146 fulfill
its objectives? Not entirely. Three facets of Rule 146 bear scrutiny
here: 1) the investment sophistication to be possessed by the offeree or
his offeree representative; 2) the offeree's "ability to bear the economic
risk of investment"; and 3) the access-disclosure dichotomy.
1. Under Rule 146, either the offeree or his offeree representative,
if one is utilized, must possess investment sophistication. It is clear
that this requirement will not be met on the basis that the offeree (or
offeree representative) is a man of business experience or a man with
'Id.
1
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prior investment experience. 8 6 Rather, his knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters must be such that he is capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment at hand. The obligation is
on the issuer to see that this investment sophistication exists.
This condition is subjective, not objective. The condition would
be objective if Rule 146 provided that a certified public accountant or a
stockbroker with a specified number of years of experience would be
deemed to have the requisite investment sophistication. But no such
clear-cut guidelines are provided. The issuer continues to run a risk
when he evaluates the investment sophistication of the offeree or offeree
representative.
2. Except in a business combination, the offeree must be a person
able to bear the economic risk of investment whenever an offeree representative is not utilized. According to the SEC, "the important considerations are whether the offeree could afford to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite period and whether, at the time of the investment,
he could afford a complete loss."'1 7 Since "could afford" is ambiguous,
this condition is subjective. The issuer has the obligation to assess
whether the offeree can bear the economic risk of investment. The
issuer makes this assessment at his own risk.
3. As explained earlier, the requirements of Section (e) of Rule
146138 can be met alternatively by access on the part of the offeree or
his offeree representative or by disclosure on the part of the issuer.
The disclosure provisions of Rule 146 define with care and in an objective manner the information which must be furnished to the offeree
or the offeree representative in compliance with this section. But the
existence of access depends upon the subjective concept of an "employment relationship or economic bargaining power"'13 9 of the offeree with
respect to the issuer which enables the offeree to obtain the information
from the issuer.
How do these provisions affect the "access" requirement of the private offering exemption as it developed prior to Rule 146? Under the
interpretation of "access" represented by United States v. Hill,140 Continental,' 4 ' and adopted by the SEC, 142 the "access" requirement required
a pre-existing relationship between the issuer and the offeree. This
construction of access is the one adopted by Rule 146 in Section (e) .1 4
mExperienee in the purchase and sale of securities, under existing case law, may not
satisfy the "sophistication"
requirement of a private offering exemption. Bowers
v. Columbia General Corporation, 336 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Del. 1971).
mrRelease 5430, 2 SEC DoCKET 554.
-Id. at 559, 560.
=Id.
"United States v. Hill, supra note 65 at 1229.
""Continental, supra note 75 at 160.
"'2Release 4552, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. RzP.
2773.
"'Release 5430, 2 SEC DOCKET 554.
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The disclosure provision of Rule 146, which is an alternative to access,
is new and does not have a counterpart in the pre-Rule 146 private offering exemption law.
The pre-Rule 146 "access" requirement of the private offering
exemption has been largely responsible for restricting those offers in
which the private offering exemption could be safely and surely relied
on to the realm of offers to high-ranking executive employees of the
issuer. The existence in Rule 146 of the disclosure alternative to access
substantially broadens the number of offerings which can confidently
be labelled as private under the Rule 146 umbrella.
The issuer will find that the alternative of disclosure is more useful
than that of access because the disclosure requirement can be met with
every offering whereas the access requirement is available only for
limited offerings and also because the disclosure requirement is girded
by more objective standards than the access requirement.
Finally, it bears repeating that Rule 146 places the burden of proof
on the issuer that each and every condition of Rule 146 has been satisfied with respect to each and every offeree. 14 4 Prudence dictates that
an issuer making an offering in reliance on Rule 146 proceed with the
advice of legal counsel and that he maintain written records at each
step of the offering which will enable him to discharge his burden of
proof.
CONCLUSION
The scope of the private offering exemption to the 1933 Securities
Act was unclear as this exemption developed through court decisions
and SEC interpretations. The factors to be applied in determining if
the exemption did exist were several and their relative importance not
well-defined. The concepts of access and sophistication which followed
Ralston Purina were subjective concepts which left the issuer unsure
whether he had met the requirements of the exemption. Under its narrowest conception, the private offering exemption was virtually nonexistent outside of an offering to high-ranking executive employees of
the issuer.
Proposed Rule 146, as revised, has brought a measure of relief to
this situation. It has largely succeeded in its goal of setting objective
standards for the operation of the private offering exemption. There
remain some ambiguities within the proposed Rule, especially the measure of investment sophistication to be possessed by the offeree or his
offeree representative and what constitutes the "ability to bear the economic risk of investment." But there is clearly a limit to the extent to
which the private offering exemption can be reduced to terms of mathematical certainty. Proposed Rule 146, as revised, is very helpful.
1
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